In durable goods markets, such as those for automobiles or computers, the coexistence of selling and leasing is common as is the existence of both corporate and individual consumers. Leases to the corporate consumers affect the prices of used goods which in turn affect the buying and leasing behavior of individual consumers. The setting of prices (or volume) for sale and lease to individual and corporate consumers is a complicated problem for manufacturers.
Introduction
The production and distribution of durable goods constitutes a large fraction of the economy: in the US personal expenditure on durable goods represents nearly a tenth of gross domestic product. To market durable goods such as automobiles, photocopiers, computers and other electronic devices, manufacturers often adopt a mix of selling and leasing strategies in both individual consumer and business markets. For example, approximately one quarter of GM's automotive production is sold to fleet purchasers such as rental car companies. A great many of these vehicles are "program" cars that GM buys back a year later, making this kind of sale equivalent to a lease. The following quote of (Sawyers 2002 ) describes automakers' dilemma: "When large numbers of program vehicles return to the market place, used vehicles prices drop. That drags down residual values of new cars. Depressed residual values erode brand image and make it difficult for automakers to offer competitive lease deals." The balance between sales and leases to businesses and consumers is an important driver of profitability and the question of how to strike the right balance has troubled automakers for years.
The longevity of durable goods is what distinguishes them from perishables, and generally makes both leasing and sales viable. The longevity often leads to second-hand markets -particularly where consumers differ in their valuation of used goods (Bulow 1982) . Competition between new and used goods creates a complex dynamic problem space for producers in terms of capacity planning, selection of distribution channels and pricing.
In this paper we investigate the dynamic interactions between the corporate and retail markets for durable goods -specifically, where the manufacturer leases his product to corporate and individual consumers and also sells new goods to individuals. Our goal is to answer the following strategically important questions: First, how should the manufacturer determine the selling price of new goods for individual consumers, and leasing prices to both individual and corporate consumers? Off-lease goods impact the used goods price, which in turn must affect the choices made by individual consumers. That leads to our second question: how is the behavior of individual consumers affected by the presence of the corporate consumer? Clearly, the behavior of the manufacturer and consumers is affected by other parameters, such as substitutability of new and used goods from the consumers' point of view. Our final question is: how should the manufacturer coordinate both the retail and corporate markets as a function of varied substitutability of new and used goods in order to maximize his overall profitability?
To contribute to the understanding of the strategic interactions between a manufacturer and his corporate and individual consumers, we construct a model where both retail and corporate markets exist.
There is a single corporate consumer who leases new goods according to its demand function. Individual consumers use no more than one unit of good in any particular time period. All consumers prefer using newer goods, but the strength of the preference varies between consumers. The used goods markets are not frictionless and sellers incur transaction costs on the secondhand markets. The transaction costs for the manufacturer are lower than the transaction costs for the individual consumers.
The interaction between the manufacturer and consumers is modeled as a dynamic game with alternating moves. Both the manufacturer and the consumers seek to maximize discounted profit/utility over an infinite horizon. We demonstrate that there exists an equilibrium solution where individual consumers fall into four groups: those that do not participate in the market, those that only use used goods, those that buy goods when they are new and then use them for the lifetime of the good, and consumers that lease new goods every period. We show that (1) as the manufacturer increases the number of goods leased to the corporate consumer, he should reduce the number of new goods on the retail market, (2) as long as there are individual consumers who do not participate in the market, aggregate surplus of the individual consumers is increased by the addition of the fleet consumer; (3) if there are consumers that lease goods every period, there will also be consumers that buy new goods and use them for a lifetime; (4) if used goods are poor substitutes for new goods the lease price may be higher than the sale price.
The paper proceeds as follows. We provide a brief review of the related literature in the rest of this section. In Section 2, we describe the model settings and formulate the problem as a dynamic gaming problem. In Section 3, we characterize consumers' behavior in terms of their individual consumption strategy in equilibrium. In Section 4, we provide an explicit solution of the model and draw managerial insights. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Literature Review
Economists were first to highlight that a number of issues faced by producers and consumers of durable goods are distinct from those associated with perishables. Coase (1972) noted that a monopolist producer of durable goods is unable to extract monopoly rents because of the time-inconsistency in the monopolist's commitment to future prices. When a product is durable, its demand decreases with every period and the manufacturer has an incentive to lower the price over time to attract the remaining consumers. Strategic consumers anticipate price decreases and, assuming they are sufficiently patient, delay purchasing durable goods until the price drops to a competitive (non-monopoly) level. Coase (1972) conjectured that a durable goods producer preserves monopoly power by leasing the goods and controlling the second-hand market. Through the control of the second-hand market, the monopolist internalizes the effect of future decisions on the value of units that have already been produced. A number of papers that followed examined the assumptions under which Coase's conjecture does or does not hold or focused on alternative strategies for dealing with the problem of time inconsistency. For, example Bulow (1986) showed that the manufacturer can alleviate the time inconsistency problem by reducing the durability of its products --thus durability and selling/leasing decisions are equivalent choices. Since Coase's conjecture several alternative explanations of leasing have been proposed in the academic literature. Leasing has been seen as a mechanism for improving the efficiency of used goods markets and increasing consumers' willingness to pay (Hendel and Lizzeri 2002; Johnson and Waldman 2003; Waldman 2003) . Information asymmetry is frequently observed in the second-hand markets: a seller knows the quality of the used goods he is selling, but the buyer is not able to verify their quality.
As a result a buyer is not willing to pay the price for a high quality used good and owners of such goods are reluctant to bring them to market. This phenomenon, referred to as adverse selection, leads to a "market for lemons" (Akerlof 1970) . With leasing it is the original producer who brings all the used goods to market, and information asymmetry is eliminated. The efficiency of the used goods market is increased since consumers are willing to pay higher prices and the higher quality used goods find their way to market.
Concurrent leasing and selling have become commonplace in the automotive and IT industries.
Several authors (Desai and Purohit 1998; Hendel and Lizzeri 2002) demonstrate that selling and leasing can be employed as a mechanism to differentiate among consumers. Porter and Sattler (1999) note that when consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for new and used goods then secondary markets benefit both producer and consumers. Consumers who value newer goods the most trade-in their older goods and purchase new ones. The producer benefits from the additional demand. Consumers who place lower value on the good can purchase from the used goods market. Desai and Purohit (1999) study how product reliability and market competitiveness affect the relationship between leasing and selling. Huang et al. (2001) focus on the role of transaction costs in second-hand markets. They show that if the transaction costs for the consumer are higher than for the manufacturer, the manufacturer chooses to control the second-hand market, and that both leasing and selling take place. The ratio of selling to leasing decreases with decreasing transaction costs. Recently, Bhaskaran and Gilbert (2005) examined the impact of a complementary product on the manufacturer's strategy, and studied the adoption of the concurrent leasing and selling to balance the manufacturer's commitment across its own market and the complementary market.
Most literature focuses on analyzing the marketing strategy when the manufacturer deals only with individual consumers. However, there are a few exceptions. Using a two-period model, Purohit and Staelin (1994) consider a manufacturer who manages two independent sales channels: dealers and rental agencies. Consumers purchase goods from dealers and rent goods from rental agencies via short-term leasing contracts. The two distribution channels interact through the second-hand market. The rental agencies are treated as exogenous. The focus is on the quantities that should be sold to the dealer and the impact of different channel structures on the dealer. Later Purohit (1997) extends the model by endogenizing the rental agency and analyzing the effect of market structures on the profitability of the manufacturer and its intermediaries. While considering two channels, these models do not consider the coexistence of leasing and selling to individual consumers.
The Model
In this section, we describe our model and lay out the assumptions regarding the product, the manufacturer as well as the individual and corporate consumers.
Time is measured discretely. The product is durable but has finite life. To capture the dynamic interaction among market participants while retaining tractability, we restrict longevity of a good to two periods: in period 1 it is new, in period 2 it is used, and after two periods the goods is not usable. The product deteriorates with time, and the difference between a new and used good is discernable to all participants.
The manufacturer is assumed to be a monopolist 2 who produces a single type of product and has no capacity constraints. A constant marginal cost c is incurred in production and marketing. New goods can be sold or leased to individual consumers. Each individual consumer owns or leases at most one unit in each period. The manufacturer leases multiple new goods to a corporate consumer. Both types of lease contract last one period, after which off-lease goods are returned to the manufacturer who resells them in the second-hand market with a unit disposal cost β . While the lease contract does not contain a buy-back option we are not precluding any individual consumer from purchasing the good at lease expiration at the prevailing used good price. The relationship among the market participants is illustrated in Figure 1 .
There is one corporate consumer that leases new goods from the manufacturer. The lease quantity is determined by the corporate consumer's own utility objective. The corporate consumer's reaction function ( ) R v is defined as the number of goods leased in a particular period in response to lease price v 3 .
2 We justify this assumption with a quote from (Waldman 2003) : "Even though most durable goods producers are not monopolist most do have market power, and monopoly analyses should provide useful insights". 3 In reality, a manufacture can face multiple corporate consumers. In that case, the one corporate consumer in our model is the aggregation of all such consumers; and so the lease quantity ( ) R v is the aggregated lease quantity of all corporate consumers.
Figure 1: Model Framework
We assume that individual consumers have infinite lives and the size of the population is a constant P . In each period consumers can either purchase a new or used good, lease a new good, or stay out of the market. They can also resell used goods in the second-hand market with a unit disposal cost α .
Since the manufacturer benefits from economies of scale, we assume that α β . At the beginning of period t the manufacturer announces the three prices and places the off-lease goods from the previous period for sale on the secondhand market. We assume that the second-hand market is competitive, and that the price of used goods, 1 t q , is resolved in such way that the second-hand market clears. All consumers are price-takers. Based on the prices announced by the manufacturer and the used goods price determined by the second-hand market, the consumers decide to buy, lease or do nothing.
Corporate Consumer
The corporate consumer leases new goods from the manufacturer. As an independent economic entity, the corporate consumer determines the optimal lease quantity in each period to maximize her discounted profit over an infinite horizon. Specifically, we assume that the corporate consumer has a profit function of ( ) 
We assume that the corporate consumer does not play strategically against the manufacturer or individual consumers. Since all corporate leases last exactly one period, a decision on lease quantity made in the current period has no effect on any future decisions or profits. Consequently, maximizing the total discounted profit amounts to maximizing the one-period profit ( )
the optimal quantity leased in response to manufacturer's price
We further assume that the corporate consumer's response function ( ) t R v is known to the manufacturer. Since there is no capacity constraint for the manufacturer, the corporate consumer's demand can always be satisfied.
Individual Consumers
At the beginning of each period a consumer is in one of two states: either owning a one-period old good or not. We use T o a is shown in Figure 2 . At State 0 
Let ( ) 
Manufacturer's Problem
The manufacturer's profit is determined by the sale and lease prices he charges for new goods, the number of new goods sold and leased as well as by the price of used goods, since he sells off-lease goods on the used goods market. The manufacturer's reward is composed of his profit from several channels.
Let t B be the number of new goods sold by the manufacturer in period t . The profit from sales is
Let t L be the total number of leased goods, which includes those leased to the corporate consumer,
The one-period profit from leases in period t is given by
In addition there is a profit stream from selling the off-lease goods which were produced and leased out last period. The profit from the sale of off-lease goods is
The manufacturer sets prices 0 t q , t r and t v each period to maximize his discounted profit over an infinite horizon:
where ( )
, , , ,
is the sum of (3), (4) and (5). At the beginning of each period t , the state of the system relevant to the manufacturer's decision includes: 1) the number of used goods in his possession to be sold in the current period, and 2) the collective state of individual consumers. The number of used goods the manufacturer possesses in the current period equals the number of new goods leased last period, namely, 
where the indicator function is defined as
The left-hand side of (7) gives the total supply of used goods: the number of goods that were leased in the previous period plus the number of used goods that are being sold by the individual consumers who own a used good at the start of the period. The right-hand side the total demand: the number of used goods that are being bought by individual consumers who do not own a used good at the start of the period. (2) and (7). As a result, the used goods price can be expressed as
The number of new goods sold in period t can be calculated as ( )
Equation (9) provides the transition function for the number of used goods to be sold in period 1 t + .
The fraction of individual consumers in the interval
θ θ θ + that own a used good at the start of period 1 t + is equal to the sum of (1) the fraction of consumers who owned nothing at the start of period t and chose to buy a new good and (2) the fraction of consumers who owned a used good and chose to sell it and buy a new good. The transition of ( )
The manufacturer's problem can be described by the following Bellman equation: 
Concept of Model Solution
We seek a steady-state equilibrium, where the manufacturer leases the same number of units every period and the aggregate state of the consumers is constant. In such an equilibrium, the time index (i.e., superscript t ) on various quantities satisfying (1) - (11) 
and the price vector * p maximizes one-period profit:
The Bellman equation for individual consumers (2) reduces to 
Strategic Behaviors in Equilibrium
In a steady-state equilibrium, all the prices are constant, including the lease price v for the corporate consumer. Each period the corporate consumer chooses her lease quantity based only on the lease price for that period. In equilibrium she chooses the same lease quantity ( ) R v period after period.
Identifying the optimal consumption strategies for individual consumers of different types is more involved. First, there are many different consumption options available for an individual consumer:
leasing, buying new or used, staying idle, etc. As the main focus of this section, we will establish that from the point of view of any individual consumer, in steady-state there are at most four optimal stationary policies, or strategies: 1) lease every period; 2) repeatedly buy a new good and use it for two periods; 3) buy a used good every period; and 4) stay idle or never use the good. Furthermore, following their optimal policies, individual consumers form four clusters according to their types: high θ individuals choose strategy 1; mid-high θ individuals choose strategy 2; mid-low θ individuals take strategy 3; and low θ individuals adopt strategy 4. We shall also partially characterize the manufacturer's behavior in choosing his optimal pricing policies.
Individual Consumer Behavior in Equilibrium
In equilibrium each individual consumer chooses a consumption strategy to maximize his own discounted payoff over an infinite horizon. We restrict ourselves to examining stationary consumption strategies since individual reward and transition functions are time-independent, prices are constant over time, and the consumer action space is finite (Blackwell 1965 Recall that
represent the discounted payoffs a consumer of type θ derives when starting in states 0 and 1, respectively. Consider a consumer that strictly prefers action SL in state 1.
For such a consumer the following inequalities must hold:
indicating that in state 1 action SL is preferable to actions S, K, and SN, respectively. Subtracting the quantity 1 q α − from both sides of (15)- (17), leads to inequalities which imply that the same consumer chooses to lease in state 0 since action L is preferable to action I, U and N.
That is, a consumer, who chooses to sell a used good and lease a new one when he owns the used good, will also choose to lease a new good when he owns nothing.
Next we consider a consumer who strictly prefers action SN in state 1. Using the argument analogous to the one used in the previous paragraph, we can show that strategies (SN, I), (SN, U) and (SN, L) are always dominated by (SN, N) . A consumer, who chooses to sell a used good and buy a new one when he owns the used good, also chooses to buy a new good when he owns nothing. Similarly we can
show that a consumer that strictly prefers action S in state 1 prefers action I in state 0. That is, a consumer who prefers to own nothing when he already owns a used good chooses to keep on owning nothing.
Strategies (S, U), (S, N) and (S, L) are suboptimal. □
We will show later that for maximizing his own profit, the manufacturer always offers his sale price 0 q and lease price r to individuals such that the following relationship holds:
Under such a condition, strategy (SL, L) dominates (SN, N) for any individual consumer, as shown in the Table 2 presents the discounted surpluses of a consumer of any type θ following the (SN, N) and (SL, L) strategies. The conclusion then follows by simply comparing the surpluses under the two strategies in each initial state. 
Furthermore, these value functions have the following easily verifiable properties: θ , 2 θ and 3 θ for the customer type parameter θ such that ( ) ( )
and.
( )
Obviously, the relative magnitudes of the three such defined points depends on the equilibrium prices r , 0 q and 1 q . Lemma 3, however, leads to the following Proposition, regarding optimal consumption strategies of individuals of different types: Of course, when the monopolistic manufacturer prices her products optimally, it may not always lead to the situation described above. For example, depending on system parameters, it might be optimal for the manufacturer to dictate 3 2 1 0 1 θ θ θ < < < = , which implies that no individual will choose to lease a good.
Manufacturer Behavior in Equilibrium
Here we show that in any steady-state equilibrium, the manufacturer's optimal prices satisfy (18).
Complete characterizations of the manufacturer's optimal pricing polices will be illustrated and discussed in greater detail in Section 4.
Lemma 4. In steady-state, the manufacturer's optimal pricing strategy satisfies
Proof. Assuming to the contrary that the manufacture sets his prices such that ( )
Then, an individual of any type θ will find that the strategy (SN, N) of "repeatedly buying a new good and selling it after using it for one period" dominates the strategy (SL, L) of leasing a good every period.
Both strategies generate the same per-period utility of 
As a consequence, any pricing strategy satisfying (22) 
from each individual that uses the (SL,L) strategy (recall that c is the manufacturer's marginal production cost). (24) (SN, N) , would be induced to switch their consumption strategy. This last condition ensures that both the supply and demand sides of the used goods market are unchanged, and therefore, used good price 1 q will remain unchanged, and consequently, the new pricing policy can, indeed, be feasibly generated. □
Model Solution and Managerial Insights

Methodology for Finding a Steady-State Solution
Under the assumptions of the Lemmas in the previous section, consumers are partitioned, in steady-state, into four types along the θ continuum: those in the interval
θ that do not participate in the market, those in 3 2 [ , ] θ θ that buy used goods every period, those in 2 1 [ , ] 
P be the number of consumers that lease goods every period, then L P can be calculated as
Similarly, the number of consumers in 3 2 [ , ] θ θ that buy used goods every period can be calculated as
Since all the off-lease goods must be sold to individual consumers, we have the following "conservation of goods" equation, which corresponds to (7):
Combining (25), (26) and (27) we can find the price of used goods 1 q , the number of individual consumers who lease goods L P and the number of consumers who buy used goods U P , as functions of the prices set by the manufacturer.
The number of consumers in 2 1 [ , ] θ θ that buy new goods in any one period, denoted by N P , equals the number of consumers who keep their used goods, denoted by K P , is 
and
Explicit Model Solution and Managerial Insights
To gain managerial insights, we make several simplifying assumptions about system parameters. These assumptions allow us to obtain an explicit model solution. First, we assume that customers value new and used goods according to the following simple linear functions: Here, without loss of any generality, we normalize the maximum value placed by any customer on using a new good for one period to be $1, and the maximum value for a used good to be $ δ . The parameter δ obviously measures how close of a substitute used goods are to new ones. The closer δ is to 1, the closer the substitution.
We assume that consumers of different types are distributed uniformly on [0, 1] . That is,
Without loss of generality, we normalize the individual consumer population to 1 P = . Finally, to reduce the clutter in algebraic expressions without losing significant insights, we show the results when the discount factor 1 γ = .
With these assumptions, the three break points are
The four possible subgroups of the consumer population are given by
The market clearing price for used goods is
Substituting the above quantities into (28), we rewrite manufacturer's profit function as 
where, 1 q is given by (33).
The manufacturer chooses prices 0 q , r and v jointly to maximize his profit function (34), subject to the system constraints (29) and (30) . In the sections that follow, the joint optimization problem is solved sequentially in two steps. In step 1, we consider the corporate leasing price v , or equivalently the corporate leasing quantity ( ) R R v = , to be fixed, and find the corresponding optimal consumer selling price 0 0 ( )R * = and consumer leasing price ( ) r r R * = .
In step 2, we substitute 0 0 ( )R * = and ( ) r r R * = back into the profit function (34), and, once the specific function form of ( ) R R v = is known, find the global optimal corporate leasing price v * or, equivalently, the optimal leasing quantity ( ) R R v * * = . The "step 1" analysis, carried out in the next subsection, allows us to examine carefully a number of issues, including how the introduction of a corporate leasing program affects the consumers' market --from the viewpoints of both the manufacturer and individual consumers.
The "step 2" analysis is illustrated in Subsection 4.2.2.
Impact of Corporate Leasing on Individual Consumers Market
By leasing goods to the corporate consumer, the manufacturer increases the number of used goods available to individual consumers on the second-hand market. As one would expect, the market price of used goods decreases as the availability of off-lease goods increases. However, as equation (33) indicates the price of used goods is affected not only by the leases to the corporate consumer, but also by the lease price the manufacturer sets for individual consumers. If the manufacturer were to raise the individual consumers' lease price without correspondingly increasing the sales price, the number of individuals who lease would decrease. Decreasing the number of individuals that lease would in turn decrease the total number of used goods available, and that, in turn, would increase the used goods price. Indeed, our model shows that for a broad range of system parameters, as the manufacturer increases the number of goods leased to the corporate consumer, he raises the individual lease price to maximize his profit. The price paid by individual consumers for purchasing new goods does not change, nor does the number of consumers that purchase new goods. An increase in the lease price for individuals means that the number of individual consumers who lease decreases. However, the number of used goods available on the market grows faster -so the total number of consumers participating in the market increases. Proposition 1 specifies the conditions on system parameters and the corresponding model solution that lead to these conclusions. Later in Proposition 2 we present model solutions and draw further conclusions for cases that violate the assumptions of Proposition 1. 
The resulting market clearing price for used goods is
Proof: It is straightforward to verify that the profit function (34) is concave in r and 0 q , and that the first-order conditions lead to the unique solution (35). Furthermore, under the conditions on parameters specified in the Proposition, the solution to the first-order conditions satisfies constraints (29) and (30) and, hence, is optimal for maximizing the profit function. □ According to (35) as the manufacturer leases more goods to the corporate consumer, he raises the lease price for individuals, but does not change the price for an outright sale. An increase in the leases to the corporate consumer initially increases the supply of used goods thus lowering their price and making leasing to individuals less profitable for the manufacturer. A lower used goods price induces some individual consumers to switch from following the strategy of buying new goods to that of buying used ones. Higher leasing price, on the other hand, pushes other individuals to switch from leasing to buying new goods. Consequently, it is not obvious how the manufacturer should optimally adjust the selling price with increase in leasing to the corporate consumer. Indeed, it turns out that the optimal selling price does not change, as seen from (35).
Note that for large enough values of R , such that
the leasing price to individuals ( ) r R * exceeds the selling price 0 q * . In fact, for 0 ( 1 2 ) 3 c δ β
the leasing price is always higher than the selling price. For fixed production cost c and used goods valueδ , the threshold value R decreases with transaction cost β , implying that the higher the transaction cost, the sooner the manufacturer's optimal leasing price to individuals surpasses the optimal selling price, which is rather intuitive. The higher leasing price can be interpreted as a surcharge for convenience.
Manufacturer's optimal prices induce individuals to take different consumption strategies according to their individual preferences. Substituting (35) into (32), we get the sizes of different subgroups as
and 2 1 ( ) . 1 3
(1 3 )
The number of individuals choosing to lease in (37) decreases with R due to the increased individual leasing price charged by the manufacturer. Due to the lower price of used goods the number of individuals buying them in (39) increases while the number of individuals choosing to stay idle decreases.
As can be seen from (38) (37)- (39) into (34). We have ( )
1 1 1 1
The manufacture selects the leasing price v which determines Market 2 is characterized by the absence of non-participants. Market 2 evolves from market 1 when used goods are poor substitutes for new goods. In such a case an increase in corporate leasing causes the price of used goods to decline precipitously. Once the used goods price is zero all the individual consumers participate in the market -essentially used goods are being given away to satisfy the "conservation of goods" constraint 5 . In market 2 the manufacturer still leases and sells new goods to individual consumers, raising both leasing and selling prices as R increases. In market 2, in contrast to market 1, the manufacturer finds it necessary to adjust both the leasing and the selling prices to increase profitability. The leasing price is always above the selling price. Interestingly the total number of buyers remains unchanged, although who the buyers are changes. The number of leasers decreases with increasing R . Once there are no more leasers, market 2 transforms into market 4. There are only two types of individual consumers in market 4: those that receive free used goods every period and those that buy new goods. As R increases, the manufacturer increases purchase price to reduce the number of buyers, since more individual consumers are needed to accept free used goods. In both markets 2 and 4 the aggregate consumer surplus decreases with increasing R . All consumers participate in the market, but some of those that buy new goods would have preferred to lease, and some of those that receive used goods would have preferred to buy new goods.
When used goods are somewhat better substitutes for new goods δ lies between ( )
As corporate leasing increases market 1 evolves into market 3 and then market 4. The difference between markets 2 and 3 is that in market 3 there are no leasers, while in market 2 there are no non-participants. In market 3, the manufacturer is able to maintain used goods price above zero. As R increases the used goods price falls, and the number of consumers that choose to buy decreases. However the aggregate consumer surplus grows with R . Consumers, on the aggregate, are benefiting from increased market participation. leasing to individuals can never be optimal for the manufacturer, thus market 3 evolves into market 5.
Only two types of consumers are present in market 5: those that buy used goods and those that do not participate in the market.
Optimal Leasing to Corporate Consumer
The manufacturer's optimal leasing price v * and the corresponding corporate leasing quantity The leasing price v * must then satisfy the following first-order condition: As expected, the manufacturer's optimal leasing price v * increases with marginal production cost c and transaction cost β . It should be noted that to assure the optimality of v * , the corresponding leasing quantity R * computed above needs to fall within the boundaries for market 1, as defined in Proposition 1.
Otherwise, it is optimal for manufacturer to operate under one of the other four possible markets, and the optimal corporate leasing price and quantity should be found accordingly.
Conclusion
In this paper we investigated the coexistence of selling and leasing of finitely durable goods, when the producer of the goods is a monopolist and there are both corporate and individual consumers. The individual consumers have heterogeneous preferences and each uses no more than one unit of good at any time. The corporate consumer may use multiple units of good. We examined how the addition of the corporate consumer affects the market equilibrium, the pricing decisions of the manufacturer and the individual consumers' surplus.
We modeled the interaction between the producer and the consumers as an infinite horizon dynamic game, where the objectives of the parties, the monopolist and the consumers, are to maximize their discounted profits over an infinite horizon. We assumed that the used goods markets are not frictionless, and that both the monopolist and the consumers incur transaction costs when they sell goods on the second-hand market. Further we assumed that the transaction costs incurred by the monopolist are lower than those incurred by individual consumers. Using a model where the goods last two periods and assuming "conservation of goods", we showed that under very mild and reasonable assumptions about the individual consumer utility function, individual consumers separate into four groups along their utility continuum: those that do not participate in the market, those that buy used goods every period, those that buy new goods and use them for two periods, and those that lease new goods every period.
We measured the substitutability of new and used goods by the ratio of the consumer values for new and used goods. Under additional assumptions about the individual consumer's utility function we showed that as used goods become poorer substitutes for new goods the manufacturer may charge more for a single-period lease than for selling the good outright, since the manufacturer will remove from the consumer the burden of disposing of a used good. We also found that as long as there are nonparticipating consumers in the market the addition of a corporate consumer increases the aggregate welfare of individual consumers. Consumers that were previously unable to participate in the market, now do -since used goods become more plentiful and more affordable. We also found that in some situations where it is profitable for the manufacturer to lease more goods to the corporate consumer, the manufacturer controls the individual consumer market by adjusting the lease price and keeping the purchase price constant. If used goods are poor substitutes for new goods, then the manufacturer adjusts both lease and sale prices as he increases the number of goods leased to the corporate consumer.
Opportunities for further research are wide. A possible area to explore is how differences in the terms of individual and corporate leases affect the equilibrium. In our model both corporate and individual leases lasted one term. In a number of industries, corporate leases are shorter than leases to individual consumers. Adding in competition is another area that would be interesting to explore. 
Appendix: Tables of Detailed Model Solutions
